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Japan’s food self-sufficiency ratio is remarkably low compared to other industrialized 
nations. Growing world population, food, water, and energy shortages in combination with 
climate change and the rising competition for the world’s limited resources are the 
transnational dimensions of food and nutrition security related risks that are already 
affecting Japan. This paper analyzes the development and institutional context of Japanese 
policies related to its food security, particularly in relation to its commitments to support 
developing countries and to promote food security in Africa. One dimension of particular 
interest is the Japanese engagement in large-scale land investments in Africa. 
ProSAVANA, Japan’s most ambitious initiative in its development cooperation with 
African countries is introduced as a case study. The international context of examining 
Japan’s large-scale land investments highlights the fluctuation between its commitments 
to contribute to international development policies and the more narrow-minded pursuit of 
its national interests and intensified efforts to strengthen its position in international politics 
in relation to powerfully emerging China. 
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The United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defined “food security” as 
existing “when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food, which meets their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 2013, p. 16-17). Today, approximately 842 million 
people globally are suffering from chronic hunger, though starvation and 
undernourishment have been largely eliminated in some parts of the world. Interestingly, 
even for Japan, one of the world’s richest countries, food and nutrition security (Jap. 
shokuryō anzen hoshō) is a major national concern, since its high cereal import dependency 
rate and low food self-sufficiency rate place Japan in a particularly vulnerable position. 
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Japan in 2013 and 2014, including expert interviews 
with representatives from both the government and non-government sector, this study 
draws our attention to the transnational dimensions of food security issues and the 
interconnectedness between food security issues of “wealthy” and “poor” countries. In 
order to set the context of the paper, the first part introduces the reader to strategies that the 
Japanese government employed to ensure the long-term food security of the island nation, 
where interest in stability in volumes and prices of food ranks high on the political agenda. 
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The case study of ProSAVANA, Japan’s most ambitious initiative in its development 
cooperation with African countries, especially with Mozambique, will be introduced. 
Finally, the article attempts a prudent assessment of Japan’s and China’s challenges of 
long-term food security in terms of the current geopolitical situation in East Asia and in 
particular with regard to the international relations between Japan and China, which are 
troubled by political, economic, and even military competition. 
 
Japan’s Food Security in Context 
 
Japan was well on the road to industrialization before the outbreak of the Second World 
War, but still in the late 1930s around half its labor force was employed in agriculture. As 
Japan began the process of recovery in the post-WWII years and emerged as the first Asian 
industrialized nation, the agricultural landscape changed dramatically. According to 
McCormack (2001), the postwar stagnation of the domestic agricultural system “was 
matched by dependence on food imports, which had begun in the context of the postwar 
food crisis and continued as Japan became locked into place as the world’s largest and most 
profitable market for U.S. agricultural surpluses (wheat, corn, soybeans, etc.)” (p. 124). In 
the context of carrying capacity of earth and limits to growth debates, earlier concerns 
about the declining food self-sufficiency ratio as a threat to Japan’s national security 
(expressed e.g. by Balaam, 1984; Ogura, 1976) appear virulent again today.  
 With regard to China, the most populous country in the entire world today, Lester R. 
Brown earlier in the mid-1990s raised concerns about “Who will feed China?” He predicted 
China’s inevitable loss of the capacity to feed itself as demand is surging and food 
production capacity is eroding (Brown, 1995). After more than three and a half decades of 
accelerated economic growth since China’s transformation from a state-planned socialist 
economy to a state-driven market economy began in 1978, significant constraints to 
domestic agricultural production have become obvious. These include but are not limited 
to matters such as: the massive growth of urban agglomerations and the decline in arable 
land due to urbanization-related land-use changes; the continuous out-migration of people 
from rural to urban areas; increasing environmental pollution including soil erosion and 
degradation as well as processes of desertification and salinization (Chen, 2007). At the 
same time, the demand for imports, especially of cereals, is steadily growing with an 
increasing impact on international price volatility. Furthermore, intensifying competition 
for access to valuable natural resources with neighboring countries in the East Asian region 
contains the seed for potential conflict. 
The various challenges affecting global food and nutrition security today include: 
 Continuous world population growth over the next four decades and rapid 
economic growth in developing countries; 
 Poverty, inequality, and dysfunctional production and consumption patterns in 
both global and national systems; 
 Diminishing ground water resources in many countries (including Northern 
China) due to widespread over-pumping and irrigation; 
 Climate change impacts on crop yields and agricultural potential; 
 Environmental degradation due to overly intensive farming; 
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 Use of land for food or feed crops to develop biofuels to combat energy resource 
shortages; 
 Dietary changes accentuating pressures on supply (“nutrition transition”); and 
 Agricultural land investments in developing countries by foreign corporations to 
secure their own food supplies (“farming abroad”). 
 
 According to the Asia and Pacific Commission on Agricultural Statistics (APCAS), 
developing regions as a whole have made significant progress towards hunger reduction 
but marked differences across regions persist (APCAS, 2014). In most East and Southeast 
Asian countries, significant reductions in both the estimated number and prevalence of 
undernourishment have been achieved (see Table 1). Nevertheless, even in a comparatively 
rich country like Japan, food and nutrition security is a national concern firmly rooted in 
agricultural policy and development programs. Of course, use of the term has a 
fundamentally different quality in Japan than in developing countries where access to food 
for many people is a question of everyday survival. Admittedly, Japan is a highly 
industrialized country, where agriculture is a steadily declining and increasingly less 
significant area of economic activity. The contribution of agriculture to the GDP is only 
1% (compared to 10% in China), and employment in agriculture is only 4% of total 
employment (compared to 35% worldwide) (see Table 2).  
  































China 124 94 92 2.2 158.0 
Japan 112 90 100 76.8  
Korea, 
Dem. Rep. 
94 57 98 15.2 7.6 
Korea, Rep. 132 91 98 73.2 N/S 
Taiwan 118 89 N/A 85.2 1.5 
India 106 58 92 0.5 213.8 
Developing 
Regions 
118 73 87 15.5 826.6 
Developed 
Regions 
135 104 99 16.0 15.7 
World 122 79 89 15.7 842.3 
 
Note. Average dietary energy supply adequacy: The indicator expresses the Dietary Energy Supply 
(DES) as a percentage of the Average Dietary Energy Requirement (ADER) in each country. Each 
country’s or region's average supply of calories for food consumption is normalized by the average 
dietary energy requirement estimated for its population, to provide an index of adequacy of the food 
supply in terms of calories. Analyzed together with the prevalence of undernourishment, it allows 
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discerning whether undernourishment is mainly due to insufficiency of the food supply or to 
particularly bad distribution (FAO Food Security Indicators). 
N/A = No data available 
N/S = Statistically non-significant 
 
Source: FAO Food Security Indicators (as of Oct. 1, 2013). Retrieved from 
http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/  
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China 10 35 9.3275 55.7 0.08 12.0 




N/A N/A 0.1204 21.2 0.09 19.1 
Korea, 
Rep. 
3 73 0.0971 18.1 0.03 15.4 
World 3.13 35 129.7123 37.6 0.2 11.9 
 
Notes. 
1 Agricultural land refers to the share of land area that is arable, under permanent crops, and under 
permanent pastures. 
2 Arable land includes land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas 
are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen 
gardens, and land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded. 
3 Figures are for 2010. 
N/A = No data available 
 
Source: The World Bank Indicators. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
 
 In China, the agricultural development during the post-Mao reform era was overall 
extremely successful. The production yields, the exports of agricultural products, and the 
international activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises have increased significantly. 
However, the efforts of the Chinese government to large spatial expansion of domestic 
arable land towards central Asia has proven limited despite the progresses in cultivation 
technologies. Although the dry border is not sharply defined, just west of the 100th 
meridian east, rain fed agriculture is possible in some years, but mostly extremely difficult 
because of droughts that result in severe erosion and deflation damage, so that sufficient 
yields are only possible with continuous irrigation. At the same time, cultivated land is 
being lost in the southeast of China due to the intense competition over land use (e.g., for 
industry, transport, and residential areas), and in the northwest of China due to processes 
of soil erosion and accelerated desertification. After all, in the traditionally intensively used 
agricultural regions of Eastern China, the land productivity could be increased 
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considerably, not least by the huge increases in the use of fertilizers. China emerged as the 
world’s largest consumer of fertilizers and the largest producer country of nitrogenous 
fertilizers (see Table 3). Agriculture in these areas, however, is threatened by rising sea 
levels due to global climate change with massive economic and social impacts. This is also 
a challenge for Japan, which is highly dependent on agricultural imports. 
 
Table 3: Agricultural Profiles of Five Key Nitrogen Fertilizer Markets 
 
 Arable land 
(million ha) 
















































Source: Yara Fertilizer Industry Handbook, December (2012, pp. 20, 53) 
 
Agriculture in Japan 
 
Today, Japan produces only about 39% of the food it consumes (March 2013, see Statistics 
Bureau of Japan, 2015). This is a major decrease from the 79% in 1960, and the lowest 
food self-sufficiency ratio among all major developed countries. Surveys conducted by the 
Cabinet Office reveal that consumers are becoming ever more concerned about the 
dependency on food imports. One major cause is the significant changes in the Japanese 
people’s diet in the post-war years with higher consumption of meat and fat in particular, 
and this factor is directly linked to a decrease in the demand for domestic agricultural 
produce. The proportion of rice output in total agricultural output and the per capita 
consumption of rice in Japan have both decreased to roughly half from the early 1960s. 
Moreover, Japan depends on a very small number of countries for the majority of its food 
imports. Imports from the United States represented more than 25% of Japan’s total 
agricultural imports of over $60 billion USD in 2012, and there is a particular dependence 
on the United States for grains and legumes. ASEAN, China, and the EU-27 were the next-
largest suppliers with a combined share of over 39%. Meats are the largest component of 
Japan’s agricultural imports, and based on the value of imports, Japan is the largest meat-
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importer in the world.1 The import dependency makes the food supply base quite 
vulnerable and is also a consequence of Japan’s import liberalization policies, partly forced 
by pressure from abroad, in the course of the internationalization and liberalization of 
world trade.  
 




Percentage of those 65 
years and over 
Agricultural land 
(million ha) 
1990 4.819 33.1 5.243 
1995 4.140 43.5 5.038 
2000 3.891 58.2 4.830 
2005 3.353 58.2 4.692 
2010 2.606 61.6 4.593 
2012 2.514 60.3 4.550 
 
Note. “Commercial farmers” are farmers with cultivated land under management of 0.3 hectares and 
over, or with annual sales of agricultural products amounting to 500,000 Yen and over. 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan, retrieved from www.stat.go.jp  
 
 It is not surprising in this context that the global financial and agricultural price crisis 
in 2007-08 has revived older debates about the food security and even national security of 
Japan, including the long-term viability of its agricultural sector. Maye & Kirwan (2013) 
stressed that the FAO Rome Summit on World Food Security in June 2008, initiated 
directly in response to the food price increases, symbolized food security’s renewed 
geopolitical status. Japanese politicians and policy-makers were reminded again of the 
potential threats arising from these transnational dimensions of food security related risks. 
Because of these risks, the Japanese government is now seeking to increase the food self-
sufficiency ratio to 50% on a supplied calorie basis by 2020. The most important issue is 
to support and maintain domestic farmers and cultivated land. However, this is not an easy 
task because of the structure of Japan’s agricultural sector and a costly, unrewarding rural 
development policy. In fact, the sector is facing a long-term downward trend and major 
structural problems indicated by massive declines in such figures as agricultural 
production’s share of Gross Domestic Product and agricultural working population 
(Yamashita, 2008). Most notably, the number of farmers mostly engaged in farming and 
the area of cultivated land has decreased significantly. This is mainly due to advances in 
mechanization, a decrease in the prices of agricultural products and a decrease in 
agricultural income, thereby reducing the domestic food supply capacity (see Table 4). The 
number of abandoned farms has risen dramatically, not least because of the many older 
farmers retiring and the lack of successors to existing farms. The loss of arable land due to 
abandonment and conversion of farmland into residential and commercial land is mainly 
due to postwar processes of industrialization and urbanization. Comparative data on 
                                                 
1 Data derived from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research 
Service, retrieved from http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/countries-
regions/japan/trade.aspx#.U3oAFV5TbL8  
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agricultural land area per farm household for different countries hint at another structural 
problem: small- and mini-sized farms dominate Japan’s agricultural sector. That means 
that the scope for major technological advances in agriculture is limited because these are 
most beneficial to large farms. Tax legislation and lease rights applying to agricultural land 
inhibit the rounding up of ownership shares of farmland.  
 Moreover, demographic change is a major challenge for rural Japan. That means that 
populations are aging and decreasing, and these demographic processes reinforce 
disparities between shrinking and growing cities and regions (Matanle et al., 2011). 
Statistics reveal that Japan’s farming population is already dominated by the elderly 65 
years of age and over (see Table 4). The government nowadays recognizes many rural 
communities as “marginal settlements” (Jap. genkai shūraku) – communities living on the 
edge of extinction through depopulation because people aged 65 years or older make up 
more than half the total population. Hundreds of Japanese towns and villages have reached 
the limits of their manageability as their low population density and reduced vitality have 
led to underdeveloped local infrastructure and limited availability of services. Most 
severely affected by population losses and ageing are rural areas in hilly and mountainous 
regions, which cover 70% of Japan’s total land area. They are still important with regard 
to agricultural production. Both the number of farm households and the cultivated land 
under management in these areas account for 40% of the national total, respectively. Thus, 
it is not only rural communities but the agricultural sector as a whole that is at risk of further 
diminishing. 
 A final reason for Japan’s agricultural sector dilemma is protectionism and 
interventionism, including tariff protection and price supports, mainly disadvantaging the 
small group of full-time farmers. According to the OECD (2009) report on agricultural 
policy reforms in Japan, improving competitiveness is essential to the future prosperity of 
Japan’s agricultural sector and, thus, a key to the country’s food security. The most 
important steps to secure the future prosperity of agriculture would be to establish a more 
competitive, more efficient farm sector and open trade in agricultural products, and to 
improve market-orientation instead of income support payments. The report explicitly 
highlights the ability to produce high-quality and specialized products for local, domestic, 
and even foreign markets, including the growing demand for organic food for example, as 
a key strength. However, both recommendations run contrary to Japan’s traditional 
agricultural protectionism and interventionism, especially in favor of rice farming. George 
Mulgan (2000, 2005) and McCormack (2001) have identified the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and agricultural cooperatives known as Nōkyō (abbreviated 
for Nōgyō kyōdō kumiai) as fierce defenders of this policy approach which have a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo. 
 Undoubtedly, the low self-sufficiency ratio makes Japan economically vulnerable. A 
food crisis, caused by export bans, crop failures, unrest, or even wars in supplier countries 
is the nightmare scenario – a scenario which, however, must be put into perspective by 
taking into account the extraordinary economic strength of the country and its alleged 
ability to manage market risks, even at significantly higher costs. The OECD (2009) states, 
“most modern food security risk is price risk rather than quantity risk …” (p. 48). However, 
protecting the wealthy at the expense of the vulnerable poor and developing countries poses 
a serious ethical issue, and it is a potential source of instability that could threaten the 
international community. After the end of the Cold War, non-traditional security challenges 
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have increasingly come to the forefront. These include challenges resulting from 
international migration, climate change, terrorism, or organized crime but also food, 
energy, and other natural resource security issues. So far, the individual nation-states have 
failed to develop instruments and strategies to effectively cope with such challenges and 
are therefore in desperate need of innovative collaborative approaches. With regard to food 
and nutrition security issues in Japan, structural changes in national agricultural systems, 
the integration into global trade with agricultural products, and access to foreign land 
through transnational land investments are in the focus of interest. 
 MAFF tackles food as a national security issue and actively promotes various 
strategies and measures to ensure the county is able to feed the people and become more 
independent from the uncertainties of the global market: firstly, to increase the quantity of 
food produced domestically and to enhance productivity of the agricultural sector through 
further intensification and specialization and encouraging production by core farmers and 
concentration of farm holdings (this is classical productivism in agriculture); secondly, to 
secure a stable import base through greater diversification and the maintenance of good 
international relations with exporting countries; thirdly, to ensure adequate stock piling for 
staple foods such as rice, wheat, and soybeans, as well as compound feedstuffs; and 
fourthly, to enforce national “food education” (Jap. shokuiku) programs, which promote 
the benefits of locally produced and purchased food and traditional Japanese diet rich in 
rice, vegetables, and fish (OECD, 2009, pp. 43-49). A rather recent strategy supported by 
the Japanese government is to develop programs to support agricultural developments in 
current and potential future supplier countries. 
 The phenomenon of foreign agricultural projects in developing countries is a very 
topical and politically sensitive issue. It has been frequently referred to as “land grabbing” 
in the media. Indeed, large-scale investments in foreign land made by agro-energy 
corporations or states have increased remarkably since the 2007-2008 global food and 
energy crises (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Clements & Fernandes, 2012). “Farming abroad” has 
emerged as a new food supply strategy by import-dependent governments including Japan. 
In search of new investment opportunities in the aftermath of the financial crisis, investors 
from the financial sector, including pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, private equity 
funds, and hedge funds, became increasingly interested in farmland. Governments 
promoting and supporting large-scale investments in foreign land have been criticized by 
non-governmental organizations for advancing the commercial interests of the world’s 
richest agribusiness corporations under the guise of promoting “food security,” especially 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (War on Want, 2012).  
 
Land Grabbing Issues 
 
From a productivist perspective as represented by the dominant agro-industry regime, the 
central solution to food security is to develop and apply new agricultural technologies in 
order to increase food production. It is largely linked to the relative abundance of land, 
agricultural raw materials, and low-cost labor in many developing countries. Evidence 
comes from the 2009 World Bank study on the future prospects for commercial agriculture 
in the Guinea Savannah Zone of Africa and beyond including a case study of Mozambique. 
Based on an analysis of the factors that contributed to the successes in the development of 
a competitive commercial agriculture achieved in Brazil and Thailand, the authors of 
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“Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giant” (World Bank, 2009) argue that opportunities abound 
for farmers in Africa to regain international competitiveness, especially in light of projected 
stronger world markets for agricultural commodities over the long term. However, Sage 
(2013) criticizes that this “food agenda” is dominated by powerful economic interests of 
the existing agro-industrial system, largely ignoring more sustainable forms of agriculture 
that build on the agro-ecological knowledge of smallholder farmers. Large-scale land 
acquisitions are frequently neglecting the interests of existing land users, excluding 
smallholder agriculture, and the rural poor are frequently being dispossessed of their land 
and resource rights (Anseeuw et al., 2012). What we also know from the increasing body 
of studies on “land grabbing” is that many of the target regions belong to the group of the 
poorest countries with serious food deficits and weak state structures, with huge deficits of 
transparency and accountability. Interest in Africa’s vast arable lands in particular, 
stimulated by the World Bank (2009) study, has been growing rapidly in step with concerns 
about future global food security. We also know that much of the investment originates 
from OECD member states, but increasingly emerging countries, particularly China and 
India, have gained importance as investors in developing countries as well. The “Land 
Matrix Global Observatory,” a global and independent land monitoring initiative that 
promotes transparency and accountability in decisions over land and investment, provides 
respective data. It promotes transparency in land transactions and supports open data 
focused on land deals published in the global database “Land Matrix”.2 As land deals are 
usually not negotiated in the public realm and official data sources are rare, we know too 
little about the diversity of involved governmental and non-governmental actors, and the 
precise nature of negotiation and decision-making processes with regard to marketization 
and mobilization of land on a transnational scale. It was only recently that Japan attracted 
public interest although the country has been present as an investor in Southeast Asia and 
in South America for several years and has always been an important actor in international 
politics. In fact, the “Land Matrix” currently lists 17 Japanese land investment projects 
abroad, with a total area of approximately 350,000 acres (about 8% of Japan’s agricultural 
land). Only two of the 17 projects are located in Africa. However, according to Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent plans to catch up with China in pursuing its own 
interests on the African continent this could change soon.  
 For two decades, the Japanese government has made efforts in the frameworks of the 
Africa Asia Business Forum and the Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD) to strengthen its relations with African nations. Ampiah (2010) and 
Yamada (2011) stressed that the advent of the TICAD since 1993 has raised unprecedented 
public interest about Africa in Japan and brought some dynamism to how Japan attends to 
issues relating to Africa’s economic development. Land investments, however, have never 
been at the center stage. At TICAD IV that took place in 2008 the Japanese government 
promised to double its Official Development Aid (ODA) to Africa by 2012 and to extend 
up to $4 billion USD of ODA loans primarily for infrastructure and agriculture projects 
(JICA, 2013). In a speech at TICAD V in June 2013 Prime Minister Abe announced 
policies to encourage multi-billion dollar investment by Japanese companies in Africa and 
support advances in health, education, and agriculture (Reynolds & Hirokawa, 2013). 
Japan also signed an investment agreement with Mozambique, its first with a resource-rich 
                                                 
2 See “Land Matrix“ at www.landmatrix.org 
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country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Such engagement is intended to prove the credibility of 
Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa and the TICAD process. One reason for the rediscovery 
of Japanese interest in Africa, of course, is the rise of China and its growing presence on 
the African continent. The competition for access to land is harsh, not only economically 
but also in the diplomatic and geopolitical arenas. Global multi-industry companies, 
government, and semi-government organizations are among the major actors including 
well-known large Japanese enterprise groups like Itochu, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, or Sumitomo. 
The most important state actor involved is the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA, Kokusai kyōryoku kikō), which facilitates the consultations between the 
governments involved and overviews the implementation of development projects.  
 




Note. 1 “Technical Cooperation” expenses excluding management expenses. 2 Amount of “Loan Aid” 
distributed. 3 Amount of concluded “Grant Aid” agreements. Source: JICA (2013, p. 15) 
 
 Established as an Incorporated Administrative Agency (Jap. dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin), 
JICA is an independent governmental body which “aims to contribute to the promotion of 
international cooperation as well as the sound development of Japanese and global 
economy by supporting the socioeconomic development, recovery or economic stability of 
developing regions.3 In terms of Official Development Assistance disbursements, Japan 
ranked fifth worldwide among the member states of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) after the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France in 2012, but 
only 20th in terms of the proportion of ODA to Gross National Income (JICA, 2013). JICA, 
providing bilateral aid in the form of Japanese ODA loans, grant aid, and technical 
                                                 
3 See JICA’s homepage at www.jica.go.jp/english/about/organization/index.html  
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cooperation, is one of the largest development organizations in the world (see Figure 1). In 
2008, JICA emerged in its current organizational structure when the overseas economic 
cooperation operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and grant 
aid operations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (excluding those which MOFA continues 
to directly implement for the necessity of diplomatic policy) was organizationally 
integrated into JICA. Currently, it employs more than 1,800 full-time staff and oversees a 
network of about a hundred overseas offices including 26 on the African continent. 
 
Japan in Africa and ProSAVANA 
 
Japanese food security issues are directly linked to Japanese government policies aimed at 
promoting food security in Africa (MOFA, 2013), policies that intentionally result in the 
marketization of African land. For example, while Mozambique’s agricultural sector 
primarily consists of small farmers and large tracts of land which have generally not been 
parceled out since the end of the civil war in 1992, many farmers remain unaware of their 
land use rights as individuals and as communities and are in danger of being left out from 
decision-making over government-acknowledged land allocations to foreign investors. The 
demarcation and registration of land use rights, however, is essential when it comes to the 
mobilization of land, especially in relation to the transnationalization of markets based on 
inviting foreign investors from Brazil and Japan.  
 According to Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter approved by Cabinet 
decision in August 2003, the main objectives of ODA are “to contribute to the peace and 
development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own 
security and prosperity.” The link to Japanese self-interests and “strategy diplomacy 
efforts, such as resource development strategies, reinforcing maritime safety and security 
capacity and strengthening cybersecurity” (JICA, 2013, p. 18), is being made explicit. 
Rather loose historical ties with African nations and the absence of any colonial legacy, 
however, is seen as a Japanese advantage in providing development assistance according 
to each recipient country’s specific needs. During the five-year period from 2008 to 2012, 
Japan spent an average of $1.815 billion USD total annual ODA contributions to Africa 
(JICA, 2013).4 Among others, JICA is involved in projects supporting the establishment 
and improvement of economic development corridors and value chains for agricultural 
products as well as the promotion of agricultural development and rice production to 
increase food production. In its recent annual report JICA (2013) argues,  
 
Due to the potential and the enormous internal demand for food, Africa is one of the 
world’s most attractive continents for agricultural development. To this end, Africa needs 
to raise the incomes of individual farmers. Plans for agricultural development are to be 
created at the national level, productivity is to be raised by modernizing agricultural 
operations and market-oriented agriculture such as growing value-added crops must is to 
be [sic] introduced. (p. 54) 
 
                                                 
4 Brautigam (2011, p. 211) assessed that in 2008, China disbursed about $1.2 billion USD in Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa, compared with the World Bank ($4.1 billion USD), the 
United States ($7.2 billion USD), and France ($3.4 billion USD). She estimates that Chinese aid 
probably rose to $1.4 billion USD in 2009. 
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 With regard to agricultural development projects, the promotion of stable food 
production in aid receiving countries of course also contributes to global price stability and 
to ensure food security in Japan itself. JICA, of course, stresses the tangible benefits for 
the target countries: previously unused land would be made productive; technology transfer 
is taking place in the agricultural sector of the target country and thus the local food 
situation will be improved; jobs would arise and thus poverty be tackled effectively; and 
additional investments in the development of economic and social infrastructures of 
underdeveloped rural areas contribute to the strengthening of local community resilience.  
 Hidden from public interest for several years, Japan under JICA leadership has been 
involved in the so-called ProSAVANA project in Mozambique. It was only recently that 
Japan got caught up in the maelstrom of critical reporting on land grabbing (Funada 
Classen, 2013; Nogueira & Ollinaho, 2013). In fact, the governments of Japan, Brazil, and 
Mozambique have been pursuing their “Triangular Cooperation for Agricultural 
Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique (ProSAVANA-JBM),” 
implemented in the framework of the Japan Brazil Partnership Program since 2009 (see 
Figure 2). This project is intended as a model for trilateral cooperation and sustainable 
agricultural development in the tropical savannah region of northern Mozambique with its 
extensive areas of land. It aims to fundamentally restructure the agricultural sector in the 
region by introducing modern farming techniques and increasing capital investment to 
expand production and increase productivity (ProSAVANA, 2009, 2013). Brazilian 
proponents stress that the project is related to knowledge and technologies that have proven 
successful in their own country thanks to the previous development support of Japan, and 
that their agricultural expertise can be transferred to African countries in an adapted form. 
The Brazilian reference project is PRODECER, a program of Brazilian and Japanese 
corporations for the agricultural development of the Cerrado savannah in central Brazil 
from the 1970s to the 1990s. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa 
Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, EMBRAPA) and its partner institutions have 
successfully improved soil quality, developed new plant varieties for the tropical and 
subtropical regions, and pioneered new operational farm techniques including no-till 
agriculture (Lopes et al., 2012). JICA supported EMBRAPA’s Cerrado-related activities 
since it started its research in 1974. Partnerships with national and transnational 
agribusiness corporations have also been signed to make these innovations available for 
production. Today, the Cerrado is one of the world’s largest export-oriented producers of 
soybeans and accounts for 70% of Brazil’s farm output. Overall, Brazilian agricultural 
exports over the past decades have generated significant economic surpluses and 
contributed to the country’s economic growth (Clements & Fernandes, 2012). Whereas 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), 
and the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique (MINAG) signed the basic framework for 
the ProSAVANA program in September 2009, EMBPRAPA and the Agricultural Research 
Institute of Mozambique (IIAM) are also involved.  
 ProSAVANA will comprise an area of more than 100,000 km2 of land in 
Mozambique’s “Nacala Corridor” covering 19 districts in the three provinces of Nampula, 
Niassa, and Zambezia (see Figure 2). Currently uncultivated land will be exploited and 
existing smallholder agriculture on community land shall in part be replaced by agro-
industrial businesses to stimulate economic growth through increased production of food 
and agricultural commodities, mainly for export. The project will include, in the first stage 
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of production, soybean, corn, cotton, and rice, and create more than 4,000 new jobs in 
agricultural production, inputs production, and logistics operation. Essential components 
of ProSAVANA are to increase productivity through technology transfer, to foster the 
creation of associations led by foreign investors that integrate local small farmers via 
contract farming, investments into export-oriented agriculture value chains, and transfer of 
agricultural land to foreign investors (mainly from Brazil). Because all land in 
Mozambique is government-owned and cannot be purchased or sold, the acquisition of 
land use rights (DUAT, direito de uso e aproveitamento da terra) with the Government of 
Mozambique is required. 
 In September 2012, a $750,000 USD Project Development Initiative Fund was 
launched under the tri-party agreement between the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture, 
Mozambican financial institution GAPI (Small Scale Industry Support Office), and JICA 
to finance selected agri-businesses in the Nacala Corridor on a piloting basis to showcase 
the potential for agriculture development in the Nacala Corridor. In the future, financial 
resources for the agricultural development are intended to be provided through means of a 
Luxembourg regulated private equity fund (Nacala Corridor Fund) developed by Brazilian 
consulting company Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), which is also involved in the 
elaboration of the ProSAVANA Master Plan and its implementation. The objective of this 
investment fund is “to invest private equity growth capital to develop and operate own 
plantation, processing, trading and logistic companies to grow, process and supply 
agricultural products to local, regional and global export markets” (FGV Projetos, p. 37) 
and to improve the regional rural transport and logistics infrastructure. According to 
Chichava et al. (2013) the fund is expected to attract around $2 billion USD. Both the 
Project Development Initiative Fund and the Nacala Corridor Fund are not formally part 
of ProSAVANA but essential instruments for its realization. 
 Massive investments in the improvement of existing transport infrastructures are part 
of the broader project for “Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies,” covering 
an area that extends across national borders from the Nacala Port to inland districts of 
Mozambique and further to neighboring countries Malawi and Zambia. The five provinces 
in Mozambique related to the Nacala Corridor cover an area of about 500,000 km2 with a 
population of 14 million people. The development corridor concept, also promoted by the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development Secretariat and the African Development Bank 
(Mulenga, 2013), is expected to induce growth by promoting trade and private sector 
investments in infrastructure, mineral resources (coal, natural gas), and agriculture 
development based on an integrated strategy. In this context, Japan’s ODA finances key 
infrastructure projects to expand and upgrade the country’s export routes, including the 
modernization and expansion of the deep-water port of Nacala (depth >14m) and the 
upgrading of more than 650 km of trunk roads along the Nacala Corridor (see Table 5). 
The principal strategic importance of the region is as an export corridor for the output of 
Brazilian coal mining operations in Mozambique’s landlocked Tete Province (Chichava et 
al., 2013, p. 3). 
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Source: Prepared by the author based on JICA project presentations. 
 
 Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013, p. 5) stress that from Japan’s strategic interest 
perspective, the investments in Mozambique aim at increasing world food production and 
thus stabilizing global food prices. Japan, at the same time, profiles itself in the role of an 
active supporter of South-South development cooperation in the international community. 
OECD member states like Japan have become very much aware of the rise of new non-
traditional development assistance donors and have started to push for South-South co-
operations to integrate them into their own strategies with the objective of policy co-
ordination and harmonization. South-South cooperation was also identified by JICA as a 
pillar to achieve the so-called Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD) goals to 
double the rice production in Africa between 2009 and 2018 (JICA, 2009). With regard to 
ProSAVANA in particular, Japan justified the program as a “win-win-win” initiative and 
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stressed “sustainability,” “country ownership,” and “involvement of a diverse set of actors” 
as principles of its cooperation with Brazil and Mozambique (JICA, personal 
communication, March 25, 2014). Japan also initiated international negotiations for a set 
of principles for responsible agricultural investment (PRAI) that respects rights, 
livelihoods, and resources. The FAO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) eventually adopted the seven principles (see Table 6). 
 
Table 5: Japan’s ODA Agreements with Mozambique 2007-2014 (Loans) 
 




National road upgrading Montepuez-Lichinga 3.282 March 2007 
National road upgrading Nampula – Cuamba  5.978 March 2010 
Port development (Phase I) Nacala Port 7.889 March 2013 
National road upgrading Mandimba – Lichinga 6.773 November 2013 
Gas-fired combined cycle 
power plant development 
Maputo 17.2 January 2014 
 
Source: JICA ODA Loan project DATA and JICA press releases. 
 
 Nevertheless, international development NGOs, environmental groups, and 
smallholder farmers’ organizations, heavily criticize the supposed Brazilian development 
model. In the case of Cerrado, large-scale intensive grain monocultures had a dramatic 
impact on the ecosystem, causing a rapid loss of biodiversity. Clements and Fernandes 
(2012) report that land prices have increased significantly across the country as a result of 
the purchase of land by foreign investors in Brazil. The focus on capital-intensive agro-
industrial production for export replaced traditional family agriculture and did not create 
sufficient employment opportunities for all the people who have been displaced by the 
externally imposed structures. The National Union of Mozambican Peasants (UNAC, 
União Nacional de Camponeses, Moçambique) is therefore concerned about similar effects 
on the Mozambican countryside and among others supported by La Via Campesina, the 
international peasants’ movement defending small-scale sustainable agriculture as a way 
to promote social justice and dignity, and GRAIN, an international non-profit organization 
that supports small farmers and social movements in their efforts to realize community-
controlled food systems. UNAC released a statement of protest against ProSAVANA in 
October 2012, followed by another statement of protest by Justiça Ambiental and FOE 
(Friends of the Earth) Mozambique in January 2013 (JA and FOE Mozambique, 2013). 
UNAC representatives also attended several events organized by Japanese non-
governmental organizations and citizens in Tokyo, Japan, in February 2013 to facilitate a 
dialogue with the Japanese government and JICA.5  
 
                                                 
5 A more detailed analysis of the voices from civil society of Mozambique can be found in Funada 
Classen (2013) and the ProSAVANA Civil Society Report 2013. 
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Table 6: The Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) 
 
Principle 1: Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are recognized and 
respected. 
Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather strengthen it. 
Principle 3: Processes relating to investment in agriculture are transparent, monitored, and 
ensure accountability by all stakeholders within a proper business, legal, and regulatory 
environment. 
Principle 4: All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements from consultations are 
recorded and enforced. 
Principle 5: Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect industry best practice, 
are viable economically, and result in durable shared value. 
Principle 6: Investments generate desirable social and distributional impacts and do not 
increase vulnerability. 
Principle 7: Environmental impacts of a project are quantified and measures taken to 
encourage sustainable resource use, while minimizing the risk/magnitude of negative impacts 
and mitigating them. 
 
Source: UNCTAD, retrieved from www.unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/G-20/PRAI.aspx  
 
 UNAC is concerned that resident farm families will lose their farmland in the course 
of the project and would at best end up being hired in the future in the agricultural industry 
as low-paid farm laborers. ProSAVANA disregards the traditional rights of local small 
farmers, undermines traditional land use rights, and replaces traditional land management 
practices by monocultures of the global agribusiness. It provides impetus for the 
registration of land use rights to facilitate foreign investment, whereas local farmers and 
communities do not receive adequate government support to express their rights to land. 
As a result of land expropriation and resettlement, “landless” impoverished communities 
will appear which could easily boil over into social upheaval. The organization calls for 
greater transparency, access to planning documents and information, and participation of 
the affected small farmers on the ground (UNAC, personal communication, February 27 
and 28, 2013). Environmental impact or social impact assessments are not known to date, 
although JICA has strict guidelines for environmental and social considerations in place 
(JICA, 2010). Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013) argue that the ProSAVANA project is a 
manifestation of the recent mainstream development assistance storyline that herald 
foreign land investments in Africa as a potential opportunity for rural development. Foreign 
land investments are perceived as the answer to low agricultural productivity and 
underdevelopment in Mozambique, “taking for granted that ‘development will naturally 
follow’ economic growth” (Nogueira & Ollinaho, 2013, p. 14). JA and FOE Mozambique 
(2013) question the benefits for Mozambique and highlight that “Japan intends to ensure, 
outside its territory, a new source of agricultural goods at low costs, with the purpose of 
exporting them to the Asian market, especially Japan and China” (no pagination). It comes 
as no surprise that the Principles for Responsible agricultural investment were forcefully 
rejected by civil society organizations in Japan and exposed as a legitimation strategy for 
land grabbing (GRAIN, 2012). As a more promising development model alternative to the 
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export-oriented industrialization of agriculture, already back in 1996, La Via Campesina 
proclaimed the right of peoples to “food sovereignty,” which includes not only the right to 
food but also the access to and control over natural resources such as land, water, and seeds; 
self-sufficiency should take precedence over exports and world trade and traditional food 
cultures be maintained (Claeys, 2013).  
 Despite the criticism, in early April 2013, representatives of the three countries signed 
an agreement to implement the project. A document entitled “Support Agriculture 
Development Master Plan in the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique (ProSAVANA-PD), 
Report No. 2” (ProSAVANA, 2013) was leaked in March 2013 and considered as the draft 
master plan for the project by civil society organizations (JA et al., 2013). All three 
governments, however, denied the existence of a master plan, and JICA representatives in 
March 2014 expressed the view that the master plan will not be accomplished before mid-
2015 (JICA, personal communication, March 25, 2014). This leaves the governments some 
room for maneuver towards addressing certain aspects of criticism on the implementation 
of ProSAVANA. 
 
Conclusion: Food Security Issues as a Global Challenge and Japan’s Strive 
for a Stronger Position in International Politics 
 
Food and nutrition security is not a past issue; it is a pressing global challenge, because it 
means a stability risk, which may involve national, regional, and international conflicts. 
Japan, heavily dependent on food imports, has to cope with food security challenges, given 
its rapidly shrinking agricultural sector. Japan’s recent engagement in agricultural 
development of the African tropical savannah, such as ProSAVANA, is motivated by its 
aspiration to enhance food security. ProSAVANA, however, has been criticized as a form 
of neo-colonialist economic exploitation “skilfully wrapped up in the language of 
‘greenwash’ … and sold to Mozambicans and the international community under the guise 
of ‘sustainable agricultural development” (Clements & Fernandes, 2012, p. 18). In many 
African academic writings and commentaries, such land investments are regarded as a 
symptom of the new Asian colonization of Africa, no matter where in Asia the investment 
actually comes from (Kisika, 2014; Nelson, 2009). From the perspective of the individual 
states, matters of food or energy security are a fundamental basis for economic and political 
stability. 
 Vis-à-vis food security and against this background, the efforts of Japan to strengthen 
its position are nonetheless understandable. The Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICAD) has been created as an important mechanism to strengthen 
Japan-Africa ties. It became even more important in 2004-05 when the proposals for UN 
Security Council (UNSC) reform to address its “democratic deficit” and loss of legitimacy 
became hotly debated (Jiang, 2011). At that time, Japan and Germany, the second and third 
largest contributors to the United Nations, had been striving for a permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council for nearly two decades. Along with Germany, Brazil, and India, Japan is 
member of the so-called “Group of Four” (G-4), which advocates for a reorganization of 
that body, also demanding to increase the presence of African countries on the council. 
Both Brazil and India are also part of the group of the economically emerging BRICS 
countries. Such UN reorganization would, however, require the broad support of the 
General Assembly, which should explain Japan’s interest in good relations with African 
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countries. ODA became increasingly recognized as an important means to strengthen 
Japan’s standing in the international arena and eventually secure a permanent UNSC seat. 
It comes as no surprise that Japan is an active member of international organizations 
promoting major development projects in Africa. It is involved in the “African Agricultural 
Growth Corridors” initiative, which was first proposed at the UN General Assembly in 
2008 and then at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2009 and 2010, and the “New 
Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition,” a commitment by G8 nations, African countries 
and private sector partners to invest in African agriculture. This alliance was originally 
launched during the G8 Summit at Camp David in 2012, and each of the African countries 
involved is working in collaboration with one or more G8 member countries. Japan and 
the United States are Mozambique’s partner countries. As many of the investment plans 
are from international agro-business, Paul and Steinbrecher (2013) argue that both 
initiatives will reinforce each other in a major effort “to reorder land and water use and 
create industrial infrastructure over millions of hectares in order to ensure sustained 
supplies of commodities and profits for markets” (p. 1). This externally imposed re-
ordering would enhance the likelihood of conflicts over land and threaten to eliminate the 
livelihoods of local communities (see also Rajaonarison, 2014). 
 Japan actively pursues a number of policies and initiatives to reaffirm its ambitions in 
international politics. Seemingly legitimized by international policy initiatives to 
contribute to agricultural and other development projects in Africa, Japan is also seeking 
to make rural areas in Africa available for tangible self-interests of its own food and 
nutrition security. Competition with China over natural resources and food supplies 
presents major challenges and creates additional stress for political elites in East Asia. 
Several sea territories are subject of competing claims and disputes over small islands and 
coral reefs in the East China Sea and South China Sea involve geo-strategic and military 
interests, economic interests in the expansion of fishing rights and access to suspected oil 
and gas reserves. Competition for access to and control over strategically important 
international sea-lanes, serving as lifelines for a significant share of world trade, will 
remain part of international relations for the foreseeable future (Zhao, 2008). The repeated 
outbreaks of conflict are an expression of increasing “resource nationalism” and the 
associated strategic rivalries with China investing massively in expanding its armed forces, 
particularly its naval capacity. It is not by coincidence that China opposed a Japanese 
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. 
 This outline of potential for serious conflict does not imply an inevitable military 
outbreak of hostilities, though the competition “may become the spark for regional and 
international instability” (Zhao, 2008, p. 226). With U.S. hegemony in decline, “a new 
pattern of multi-directional and mutual global pressures for continuous change and 
reorientation” (Machetzki, 1996, p. 224) has emerged. The strength of East Asia as a 
comparatively new global center of global power politics needs to be measured not only in 
terms of its economic weight, but also in terms of its ability to use this weight effectively 
in international negotiation and conflict resolution. This also includes increased awareness 
of the moral responsibility to contribute to the reduction of hunger and malnutrition around 
the world beyond pursuing self-interest. Willingness to build transregional partnership and 
reinforce mutual cooperation in various policy fields, including food and nutrition security, 
could be an essential ingredient in overcoming mistrust among countries facing similar 
challenges. 
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